Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act may be permitted to our directors, officers or persons controlling us under the foregoing provisions, we have been informed that, in the opinion of the SEC, such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the Securities Act and is therefore unenforceable.
Anti-Takeover Provisions in Our Articles
Some provisions of our Memorandum and Articles of Association may discourage, delay or prevent a change in control of our company or management that shareholders may consider favorable, including provisions that authorize our board of directors to issue shares at such times and on such terms and conditions as the board of directors may decide without any further vote or action by our shareholders.
Under the Cayman Companies Act, our directors may only exercise the rights and powers granted to them under our Memorandum and Articles of Association for what they believe in good faith to be in the best interests of our company and for a proper purpose.
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
Under Delaware corporate law, a director of a Delaware corporation has a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. This duty has two components: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires that a director act in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances. Under this duty, a director must inform himself of, and disclose to shareholders, all material information reasonably available regarding a significant transaction. The duty of loyalty requires that a director act in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. He or she must not use his or her corporate position for personal gain or advantage. This duty prohibits self-dealing by a director and mandates that the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders take precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the shareholders generally. In general, actions of a director are presumed to have been made on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation. However, this presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a breach of one of the fiduciary duties. Should such evidence be presented concerning a transaction by a director, a director must prove the procedural fairness of the transaction, and that the transaction was of fair value to the corporation.
As a matter of Cayman Islands law, a director owes three types of duties to the company: (i) statutory duties, (ii) fiduciary duties, and (iii) common law duties. The Cayman Companies Act imposes a number of statutory duties on a director. A Cayman Islands director’s fiduciary duties are not codified, however the courts of the Cayman Islands have held that a director owes the following fiduciary duties (a) a duty to act in what the director bona fide considers to be in the best interests of the company, (b) a duty to exercise their powers for the purposes they were conferred, (c) a duty to avoid fettering his or her discretion in the future and (d) a duty to avoid conflicts of interest and of duty. The common law duties owed by a director are those to act with skill, care and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company and, also, to act with the skill, care and diligence in keeping with a standard of care commensurate with any particular skill they have which enables them to meet a higher standard than a director without those skills. In fulfilling their duty of care to us, our directors must ensure compliance with our amended articles of association, as amended and restated from time to time. We have the right to seek damages if a duty owed by any of our directors is breached.
Shareholder Proposals
Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a shareholder has the right to put any proposal before the annual meeting of shareholders, provided it complies with the notice provisions in the governing documents. The Delaware General Corporation Law does not provide shareholders an express right to put any proposal before the annual meeting of shareholders, but in keeping with common law, Delaware corporations generally afford shareholders an opportunity to make proposals and nominations provided that they comply with the notice provisions in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws. A special meeting may be called by the board of directors or any other person authorized to do so in the governing documents, but shareholders may be precluded from calling special meetings.
The Cayman Islands Companies Law provides shareholders with only limited rights to requisition a general meeting, and does not provide shareholders with any right to put any proposal before a general meeting. However, these rights