Total Fund Solution N-CSRCertified annual shareholder report (management investment company)

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

FORM N-CSR

CERTIFIED SHAREHOLDER REPORT OF REGISTERED MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Investment Company Act file number 811-23724

Total Fund Solution
(Exact name of registrant as specified in charter)

615 East Michigan Street

Milwaukee, WI 53202
(Address of principal executive offices) (Zip code)

Michael J. Weckwerth, President

Total Fund Solution

c/o U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC

777 East Wisconsin Ave, 6^th Fl

Milwaukee, WI 53202
(Name and address of agent for service)

(626) 914-7363

Registrant's telephone number, including area code

Date of fiscal year end: December 31, 2023 

Date of reporting period: December 31, 2023

Item 1. Reports to Stockholders.

(a)

December 31, 2023

Annual Report

Cromwell CenterSquare Real Estate Fund

Cromwell Marketfield L/S Fund

Cromwell Foresight Global Sustainable
Infrastructure Fund

Cromwell Tran Sustainable Focus Fund

Cromwell Greenspring Mid Cap Fund

1

CROMWELL FUNDS

President’s Letter

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

Dear Shareholder,

It is a pleasure to have you as a shareholder and report on the investment activities for the Cromwell Funds for the year ended December 31, 2023.

On the following pages, the Portfolio Managers of the Cromwell CenterSquare Real Estate Fund, Cromwell Foresight Global Sustainable Infrastructure Fund, Cromwell Greenspring Mid Cap Fund, Cromwell Marketfield L/S Fund, and Cromwell Tran Sustainable Focus Fund highlight key factors that influenced each portfolio’s performance during the 12-month period. You will also find a Schedule of Investments and audited financial statements for each Fund. We hope you find the portfolio reports from the various Cromwell sub-advisors to be informative. Please refer to our website for timely quarterly commentaries from all of Cromwell’s sub-advisors.

We are pleased to report that the number of Cromwell Funds continues to grow. In January 2024, Cromwell added its sixth fund—the Cromwell Sustainable Balanced Fund to the fund family. The newly launched fund includes two experienced portfolio managers—Aristotle Pacific Capital for the fixed income sleeve and Tran Capital Management for the Fund’s equity component. Aristotle, located in Newport Beach, CA, manages over $20 billion in fixed income assets and Tran, located in San Rafael, CA, also manages the Cromwell Tran Sustainable Focus Fund. More information on the Cromwell Sustainable Balanced Fund can be found at thecromwellfunds.com.

It is a privilege to have you as one of Cromwell’s valued shareholders. We appreciate your confidence in the Cromwell Funds to serve as a component of your diversified investment portfolio. Please feel free to contact me directly at 443.279.2008 if I can be of any assistance.

Thanks again for your support of the Cromwell Funds.

Sincerely,

Brian C. Nelson
President

2

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

For the 12-month period ended December 31, 2023, the Cromwell CenterSquare Real Estate Fund (Investor Class) rose 11.70% outperforming the 11.36% return of the FTSE Nareit All Equity REITs by 34 basis points (bps). The Fund generated strong absolute and relative returns in the year, generating outperformance from the benchmark from both stock selection and sector selection.

Stock selection across multiple sectors was the primary driver of performance in calendar year 2023. Rising interest rates and indications from the Federal Reserve officials that they would keep monetary policy tight created a challenging environment for REIT returns. Sectors and individual companies in which we had high conviction saw their relative valuations decrease and become more attractive due more to the macroeconomic environment than fundamental performance. As inflation cooled and interest rates began to move lower in the fourth quarter, the REIT market experienced a rapid, sharp rise in valuations.

The portfolio benefited from stock selection within the Shopping Center, Self-Storage and Apartment sectors. In the Shopping Center and Self-Storage sectors, companies with strong fundamentals were temporarily out of favor before rising in the late-year rally. The timing of the relative weight to Self-Storage was also beneficial. The sector outperformed early and late in the year when the portfolio had more exposure and underperformed in the middle of the year when the portfolio had less. The Apartments sector underperformed other sectors on an absolute basis throughout the year due to concerns about growing supply and its effects on rents. The underweight allocation to the sector added to relative performance from sector selection. We also generated alpha from Apartments through a focus on companies with exposure to coastal suburban markets which had less supply growth and thus better relative performance than companies with exposure in Sunbelt markets. Finally, Data Centers generated strong absolute and relative returns for the portfolio, rising along with other tech-related shares in a period of investor enthusiasm for all companies that may benefit from supporting the growth of artificial intelligence. An overweight to Data Centers as well as positioning within the sector added to relative performance.

Relative performance was partially offset by an underweight to some of the riskiest REITs that benefitted from a late year rally spurred by the presumed end of Federal Reserve rate hiking cycle. For example, despite a secular downward trend and concerns about weakening consumer spending in the event of a recession, Regional Mall REITs rallied strongly towards year-end. Our underweight to Regional Mall

3

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

detracted from performance. Document storage REITs saw similar effects in the year, rising strongly in the market rally despite risks. An underweight allocation further detracted from relative performance. Finally, the allocation to cash throughout the year created a small drag on performance compared to the benchmark.

Dean Frankel, CFA
Managing Director, Head of Real Estate Securities
CenterSquare Investment Management LLC
December 31, 2023

Eric Rothman,
CFA Portfolio Manager, Real Estate Securities
CenterSquare Investment Management LLC
December 31, 2023

4

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

The Cromwell Marketfield L/S Fund (Institutional Class) returned -0.10% in 2023, compared to a 26.29% return for the S&P 500 index and a 13.87% return for the equal-weighted version of the Index. This was a very disappointing outcome for our portfolio, and the best that can be said is that some of this lag is a function of aiming to protect our investors from the deep declines that took place in 2022.

Overall, our portfolio experienced a remarkable lack of movement over the course of 2023, despite the fact that we held a sizable net long position that varied between roughly 40% and 55% over the 12-month period. This did at least mean that we mitigated during the significant summer drawdown and the mini-panic within the regional banking sector in March, but we failed to capture an acceptable proportion of gains during the strong periods that ultimately dominated the year.

This was particularly true of periods that were dominated by sharp declines in rates expectations. We had positioned our portfolio to benefit from the market’s realization that the U.S. economy was nowhere near a recession in 2023, which we believed would lead to a move higher in long term rates and some outperformance for cyclically sensitive sectors.

Although we were correct in our economic assumptions, we underestimated the degree to which lower inflation readings would turn both the mood of the market and the guidance from the Federal Reserve. We also underestimated the sensitivity of our financial shorts to rates, although our losses here were at least compensated for by a remarkable surge higher by homebuilders and housing-related equities.

The performance of our cyclical exposure was very mixed. Industrials generated some strong gains, although even here performance was more diverse than we would have expected. Energy, by contrast, was a drag on performance, despite crude oil prices being rangebound, with much of the hot money leaving the sector over the course of 2023 and macro funds using energy as a rates hedge. Perhaps most frustrating was the performance of precious metal miners, where decent gains for gold (which finished 2023 at a record year end high) failed to translate into gains for the miners. Industrial metal miners were more mixed and generated decent total returns thanks to high dividends.

Our global exposure was mostly in Japan during 2023 and did generate decent positive returns which started to accelerate into the end of the year after a fairly frustrating summer. Japan’s multi-year bull market continues to gather pace and it is starting to look possible that the 1989 peak in Japanese markets will be overcome before it is over.

5

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

On the short side of the portfolio, index hedges were expensive and were reduced significantly during the fourth quarter. We have maintained our Financial shorts given that we think that market expectations for rate cuts have significantly overshot leaving the “big rate cut winners” vulnerable to reversal.

Michael Shaoul
Chairman, CEO & Portfolio Manager
Marketfield Asset Management LLC
January 2024

A Penthouse Divided

The cultural divide afflicting this nation in a presidential election year could be the most severe since that of 1860. In fact, that unfortunate turning point was marked by only one irreconcilable conflict—the question of whether individual states had the authority to sanction the ownership of one human being by another.

At present, there is a myriad of fundamentally incompatible perspectives that provoke intense rancor among sizable portions of this society, not to mention the rest of the planet. The magnitude of animosity being generated continues to expand.

Political postures and outcomes have become such an overarching concern because there is so much at stake. Too much.

Control of government in this day and age means control of more aspects of daily life than at any point in the history of the United States. The situation in Europe is similar, although their frequent experiments with totalitarian governance render historical comparisons less dramatic.

As the reach and influence of governments in the Western world has metastasized, the rewards for control of it have multiplied exponentially. Those in and aspiring to the political class constitute a new aristocracy that has probed the boundaries of their status and authority.

Across the salons and halls of power in Europe, the U.S., and every supranational organization, there is much clutching of pearls and inveighing against the existential dangers of the populist backlash that has grown in reaction to the overreach of ruling aristocracy and its loyalists in academia, business, and traditional media.

Ordinary citizens of Western democracies seem to have reached the limit of tolerance for those who have been entrusted with the reins of authority in what were always assumed to be public service roles.

6

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

In Communist China, party officials have access to separate doctors, hospitals, medicines, schools, food, housing, and other critical aspects of life that are completely off limits to the remainder of their citizens. It is little wonder that any perceived threat to that system is met with draconian responses by the party elite and the security apparatus that they control.

The exclusivity and privileges enjoyed by our self-designated ruling class are more cultural than coercive, although adherence to the party line is becoming more ironclad as a prerequisite for admission. The intellectual and moral infirmity of our most exclusive universities, which have long been regarded as training grounds for the aspirational elite, is becoming more widely known.

These highly exclusionary institutions have metamorphosized into gigantic cruise ships, each with dozens of restaurants and bars, over-compensated crews, every possible amenity and, once in international waters, immune from any restrictions on behavior or reporting requirements vis-a-vis the guardians of their guests. Each passenger gets a four-year ticket, and those who demonstrate special aptitudes for absorbing the creed may be invited to spend more time aboard. Now that footage from cameras on the U.S.S. Harvard has been viewed in prime time and their captain has been shown to lack basic seamanship skills, the public at large is beginning to get the sense that something is wildly amiss.

There is a growing sense among people in less rarified strata that the emperors and their minions have no clothes. Not only that, but they are trying as hard as they can to take everyone else’s. People seem to have had enough.

A core premise that we have held for half a century is the idea that any system incorporating fundamental, logical inconsistencies will eventually fail. The surprising aspect is that these logically compromised systems, e.g., communism, socialism, and other forms of collectivism, can last far longer than anyone can imagine. What is more, the failure of various iterations of these doomed systems does not serve to convince certain adherents that fundamentally irreparable flaws are embedded in their DNA.

Limitless authority over others has been a siren call to the ego since the dawn of time. The particular genius of the American experiment was the recognition of this dangerous aspect of human nature and a constitutional structure carefully designed to thwart it.

7

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

Heightened opportunities for imperial control of society are, now, abetted by official command of the nation’s financial resources. There is nothing to be gained in this letter by recapitulating the outsized power of the regulatory apparatus at all levels of society. We will take it as a given and assume that our readers will concede the point. It is one reason the prospect of agencies’ regulatory discretion being circumscribed by the Supreme Court is being met by the usual “threat to democracy” outcry by the administrative and bureaucratic elite.

The heavy hands of officialdom overshadowing the financial system are highlighted by the celebrity status enjoyed by the leadership of the Federal Reserve System. The constant media focus on their every utterance is reminiscent of the attention paid to Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its ministers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, just before the global petroleum sector entered a long depression.

We have suggested for many years that the Fed’s experiment with C-5 Transport money (as opposed to helicopter money, which is more modest) would end with the loss of its credibility as the long-term distortions resulting from functionally unlimited liquidity came home to roost. The inflation surge in 2021 and 2022 strikes us as a first step in this normally tedious process of long-term, secular change.

We are currently in the late stages of relief from the inflation narrative and the relentless, delayed tightening cycle that accompanied it. With lower headline inflation numbers still in the pipeline, the stage is set for a countertrend movement toward easing by the Fed.

The rate cuts and accompanying moves toward a less restrictive policy should occur in the next two quarters. It could well be preceded by some sort of financial disturbance that gets the attention of the governors and prompts a more urgent response. Despite their assurances to the contrary, inflation fighting is invariably tossed aside when some form of financial crisis hits the headlines.

There has been endless debate about whether significant tightening cycles lead to recession, or whether a mythical “soft landing” is a possible outcome. Restrictive policy following extended periods of accommodation may or may not produce a textbook recession. It will, however, invariably produce a financial crisis, which, depending on its severity and scope, may produce recession. The elusive “soft landing” of which many speak hopefully is a near cousin to the Loch Ness Monster and Big Foot. They have all proven elusive for good reason.

8

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

Monetary accommodation in response to crises that do not threaten the economy at large simply allow for sectors uninvolved with the crisis to reaccelerate, putting the Fed back behind the same parade that they assumed to have ended during their recently terminated tightening. The eventual result is an even larger speculative or inflationary excess that warrants more draconian policy.

We have watched a sizable number of these cycles, beginning with the easing in 1976 in response to lingering distress from the 1974-1975 recession and acute distress in Mexico and other developing markets. This policy action, which made perfect sense in real time, put the Fed behind the parade in terms of addressing the acceleration in inflation and the collapse of bond markets over the next five years.

Transcripts of the meeting of the Open Market Committee reveal a great deal of push and pull about the tradeoffs between inflation and financial stability. People forget that Paul Volker was Vice-Chairman at that point and was part of the consensus. Forecasting and designing policy are much easier in hindsight.

The habit of responding to market crises with rate cuts, regardless of economic data, got going in the weeks following the Hunt panic in March of 1980, and grew during the Mexican default crisis in August of 1982 and really got embedded in the Fed’s nervous system after the 1987 crash, which took place during a very strong period of economic activity (most of them do, by the way) and was not followed by recession. Thus, was born the notion of the “Fed Put,” a life raft that would be deployed by the Fed whenever markets sent out distress calls.

During the 1990s, the Fed was quicker to acknowledge and act on all sorts of market discord, from the collapse of leveraged mortgage speculation in 1994 to the emerging markets turmoil from 1995 to 1998, which culminated in the forced rescue of Long-Term Capital Management and a marked easing of monetary conditions even though the real economy was doing fine. This all culminated with the technology bubble in 2000 and a serious recession in the aftermath of its deflation.

The more frequent and more ardent exercise of the Fed’s lifelines to markets reached its apogee (thus far) with the public health threat posed by the engineered COVID-19 virus and the concurrent market declines in early 2020. It is still baffling that the Fed embarked on its most radical policy experiment under the banner of epidemiological analyses.

9

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

The size and scope of the ensuing response dwarfed any intervention that they had undertaken during two World Wars, panics, bank runs, depressions, and all other dangers in their prior 107 years of existence.

In the wake of two years of functionally limitless, costless liquidity, several structural distortions remain in the domestic and global financial systems. These will, from our perspective, determine the overarching macroeconomic and market themes for the next several years.

We wrote extensively in the Spring of 2022 (“A Kick in the Privates”) about the structural problems lurking in the vast holdings of private equity, venture capital and commercial real estate in the event of a return to normal interest rates. Thus far, the expected deterioration in these sectors is proceeding about on schedule, with the first wave of write-downs taking place in the more speculative corners of venture capital and commercial real estate. A more widespread recognition of the new reality in private equity and the larger components of venture portfolios has yet to be taken. We assume that it is on its way and may be part of a sequence that creates sufficient alarm to prompt the Fed to ease more quickly than they are currently suggesting.

The second, more salutary residue from the monetary excesses of the early portion of this decade can be seen in measures of system liquidity. The tricky aspect of these is the necessity of looking at them in terms of levels rather than the accepted rate-of-change metrics. We can find no theoretical or academic discussions for this approach, but recent levels strike us as sufficiently anomalous to demand scrutiny.

Many commentators have cited the declines in monetary aggregates over the past years as a harbinger of serious recession or worse. There is no doubt that the rate of contraction in broad money supply would, under normal circumstance, be a clear macroeconomic caution sign. The same can be said of the inverted yield curve. Both measures have led a majority of economists to call for recession for well over a year. Lots of head-scratching has ensued as recession has failed to arrive.

We have been of the view that the remarkable level of liquid and near-liquid assets in the hands of households and businesses would provide a reserve tank capable of propelling the economy even in the case of apparent contraction and policy restriction. The private sector’s balance sheet is similar to a five-hundred-pound individual who has managed to drop a hundred pounds. Smaller, but still enormous.

10

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

The only accepted technical notion that might be illustrative is Marshallian K, a measure of total liquidity to output that is the inverse of monetary velocity. On a global basis, this measure has never been close to its recent levels. In other words, the global money supply per unit of economic output has never been as abundant as at present. We suspect that this is a more pivotal metric than growth rates of monetary aggregates, but only time will tell.

Our portfolio approach to implementing our constructive view of the domestic economy has been largely mistaken. Our concentration in more cyclically sensitive areas at the expense of any net exposure to growth was almost exactly backwards. Globally traded goods were weighed down by substantial inventory overhangs remaining from the supply panic of 2022.

Serious weakness in China (another victim of the end of the free money era, not to mention the end of freedom in general) and much of Europe dampened demand for tradeable commodities and basic industrial goods. Any monetary easing from the major central banks should begin to reverse these pressures on the global economy and will likely mark the beginnings of a second wave of inflation.

Should it come to pass that a pivot toward easing rekindles a pricing cycle in globally traded goods and commodities that progresses into wider swaths of the economy, market responses may resemble those in the 1977-1980 episode. Bonds would enter a second stage of their secular downtrend; equity market breadth would narrow in response. Market leadership will migrate toward businesses with earnings leverage that correlates positively to accelerating producer prices and emerging markets should end their long stretch of underperformance.

A real shift in preferences among the small number of institutional managers still empowered to make portfolio allocations that diverge meaningfully from index and benchmark weightings will only take place if there is growing belief that a prolonged stretch of inflationary pressure is the new normal. Faith in the ability of central banks to steer economies toward salutary objectives will vanish and further corroborate global reaction against imperial elitism in all aspects of life. People who have graduated from childhood do not like being told what to do by distant coteries of strangers, no matter how gifted and insightful they profess to be.

11

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

The Fed and the comprehensive and far-reaching bureaucratic state are inventions of the 20th century that are approaching the end of their useful lives. The best description of the way forward for Western democracies was recently presented by, of all people, the President of Argentina to a gathering of the exalted few in the mountains of Switzerland. We hope that they listened closely and will take heed.

We are at a point in the cycle where enough time has elapsed since the onset of tightening to trigger some sort of discontinuous upset in sectors that cannot live with normal interest rates. Any weakness prompted by crisis would provide an opportunity to add to commodities and cyclical sectors, with the expectation that activity and prices will rebound by the second half of this year.

Michael C. Aronstein
President, CIO & Portfolio Manager
Marketfield Asset Management LLC
January 2024

12

CROMWELL FORESIGHT GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

For the period from inception on January 31, 2023 to December 31, 2023, the Cromwell Foresight Global Sustainable Infrastructure Fund (Institutional Class) returned -6.65%, compared to a total return of 1.67% for the S&P Global Infrastructure Index.

The velocity of interest rate hikes by central bankers resulted in an “annus horribi-lis” for infrastructure companies, most notably those with a higher degree of long-term contracted cash flows. Higher interest rates lower the present value of future cash flows, so the downside in infrastructure equities with long duration revenue streams was somewhat rational. However, at times, the quantum of the share prices moves was not.

By and large, infrastructure companies did well to adopt their strategies to a world where abundant cheap capital was no longer readily available. We observed a focus on deleveraging, accessing capital through avenues other than equity issuances, such as asset recycling or joint ventures, and investment pipelines narrowing to focus on high conviction markets or technologies.

The strategy’s Renewable Energy holdings weighed on performance throughout the year, with valuations hitting decade lows and sentiment negative. Despite this, 2023 set new records for the growth of renewable energy investment and portfolio holdings continued to execute on their strategic growth objectives. The struggles of the U.S. offshore wind market grabbed headlines, but this is a small part of the global market. Solar, onshore wind, and offshore wind outside of the U.S. continue to perform well and attract record flows of capital for new projects.

Digital Infrastructure delivered positive returns in 2023 and should remain one of the highest growth sub-sectors for the coming years. 2024 should provide a better view on the strength of demand for the data center space, with artificial intelligence continuing to work its way into the mainstream. Demand for data centers continues to be resilient, and an influx of new supply is likely to be hampered by permitting issues, primarily related to electricity grid constraints. This should translate to positive earnings growth, and reward data center businesses with well-developed pipelines.

The year-end rally in infrastructure companies reinforced our view that the fundamentals for the sector remain strong. The risk-free rate (the interest an investor could expect on a risk-free investment) shifting from barely above zero to north of 5% inevitably makes earnings growth harder to come by for all corporations, but the defensive nature of infrastructure businesses means it remains available. 2023

13

CROMWELL FORESIGHT GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

has shown that companies which own operational infrastructure assets will likely continue to generate growing cash flows, and the delivery of selected pipeline investments has the potential to drive additional earnings growth.

The primary “known unknown” in 2024 is the impact of higher interest rates on the economy and, more directly, corporate earnings. In a slower growth, higher interest rate, environment where earnings growth is harder to come by, the defensive nature of infrastructure should be recognized by investors. Core and Social Infrastructure companies do not have to do much to grow earnings and dividends, and on starting yields north of 7%, they look attractive. Visibility on where peak interest rates settle enables confidence in pricing real assets. With public market valuations looking cheap, and institutional dry powder looking for deals, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity may continue should a rebound in stock prices not occur.

The portfolio is constructed to invest in companies that are structurally supported by three long-term themes: decarbonization, digital infrastructure that supports a digital world, and the need for traditional infrastructure projects that support everyday life. We continue to view both the renewable energy and digital infrastructure sectors as attractively positioned for growth, with traditional infrastructure a low risk and high-income diversifier. Increased digitization of global economies is a structural trend expected to continue for many years and demand for the infrastructure used by the digital world should remain insulated from shorter term economic cycles. The energy transition trend and global decarbonization imperative also continues to provide attractive investment opportunities for the strategy across the renewable energy and energy efficiency sectors. Performance in 2023 suffered from a relatively larger allocation to renewable energy stocks. The sector remains a conviction investment theme within the portfolio, with the positioning driven by the attractive valuations on offer.

Nick Scullion
Partner and Lead Portfolio Manager
Foresight Group
December 31, 2023

Eric Bright, CFA
Senior Investment Manager and Co-Portfolio Manager
Foresight Group
December 31, 2023

14

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

There are a few insights that we’d like to share as we reflect on 2023 and position our portfolio for 2024.

First, time in the market is more important than timing the market. The second half of 2023 was turbulent as the market sold off from August through October on strong economic data that heightened the risk that interest rates would stay higher for longer before reversing course late in the year. November and December were particularly strong as investors grew more confident that the Federal Reserve’s rate tightening cycle had come to an end. In prior letters, we discussed how inflation had been moderating and our view that the Federal Funds Rate of 5.50% was adequately restrictive to combat slowing inflation. While we didn’t know when it would happen, we believed that an inflection point was near. It appears the market inflected positively in November. During the last 2 months of the year, the S&P 500 returned 14.09% while our portfolio returned 19.33%. This strong performance helped more than offset the 8.25% drawdown for the S&P from August through October. For the 8-month period from May to December, the S&P 500 returned 15.67% compared to our portfolio’s return of 22.59%. As the market waxes and wanes, we remain near fully invested and aim to use market fluctuations to capitalize on new opportunities.

Second, the market broadens out. 2023 was resilient in many ways. We experienced several important events including two regional wars, the collapse of several U.S. regional banks, and continued stress for commercial office buildings. The market’s return was strong but narrow. In 2023, the S&P 500’s returns were led by seven mega-cap technology companies, or the “Magnificent Seven” (Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Nvidia, Meta and Tesla). In fact, these seven stocks contributed 21.59% of the market’s 26.29% return for the full year. Meanwhile, the S&P 500 Equal Weight Index returned 13.87%, a strong but less impressive return relative to its market-cap weighted counterpart.¹

We are proud that our strategy performed relative to the market despite constructing a portfolio that looks very different than the overall market. Our active share is about 80%, meaning our portfolio’s names and weights are 80% different than that of the S&P 500, which again saw seven companies drive much of the performance for the year. Since the October lows, the market has started to broaden out, which we believe should benefit our portfolio.

¹ TCM and Bloomberg

15

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

Third, valuation matters. While the overall market’s price to earnings (P/E) is about 20x estimated earnings for 2024, this is lifted by higher valued technology companies. As shown in the table below, the overall market’s P/E is closer to 18x excluding the Magnificent Seven, who trade at over 27x. Many sectors are also selling at a discount to the market multiple. We think this is an important and relevant observation as we start 2024.

Fourth, earnings growth drives stock prices. While there are many factors that influence a company’s stock price, we believe that over time, earnings growth is one of the most important factors that drive stock prices. Over the past two years, as interest rates increased, the multiple investors paid for stocks declined. Now that the Federal Reserve’s tightening policy is coming to an end, we believe multiples will stabilize and company fundamentals will again take the front seat in driving stock price appreciation. We see this as a strong set up for our portfolio, which consists of companies that have the potential to grow earnings faster than the overall market. For 2024, our portfolio is expected to grow earnings 14% compared to the S&P 500’s earnings growth of 12%.²

Source: Fundstrat and Bloomberg estimates; NTM is next twelve months. Stated growth rates are estimates and may not be realized. Data as of 12/31/23.

² Weighted-average earnings growth based on Bloomberg consensus estimates.

16

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

Portfolio Positioning

We hold a portfolio of leading companies that provide essential services that we believe will result in attractive revenue and earnings growth. For instance, 35-40% of our portfolio consists of technology companies like Microsoft (MSFT), Amazon (AMZN), Intuit (INTU), and Palo Alto Networks (PANW). These companies provide essential services that can withstand many economic stresses. Additionally, demand for these company’s services continues to grow as customers invest in generative AI and these companies embed AI into their own solutions.

About 10-15% of our portfolio is invested in healthcare services companies. These include Danaher (DHR), IQVIA (IQV), and Catalent (CTLT). These companies provide essential products and services that enable the discovery and commercialization of drugs and offer investors an opportunity to participate in the growth of some of the most innovative therapies.

Finally, we strive to invest in companies that are led by executives who reinvest earnings and cash flow in strategic and smart ways. This is perhaps one of the most enjoyable parts of our work. We analyze our prospective company’s business models, competitive positioning, and capital allocation. When we find companies that meet our criteria, we often wish that we could buy the whole company. Here are a few examples of companies with strong capital allocation.

AerCap (AER) is a leading airplane leasing company. In 2021, AerCap purchased GE’s airplane leasing business at about 40% discount to equity book value. This was a once in a lifetime opportunity and catapulted AerCap as the largest lessor in the market. AerCap’s GE transaction was financed with fixed term debt at below 3% and a GE equity stake. Since this acquisition, AerCap has de-levered the balance sheet, achieved investment grade status, sold certain assets at a material gain, reduced GE’s equity stake to 0%, and pivoted to share repurchases by buying back ~18% of its market cap in 2023. Despite the stock being up over 28% in 2023, we believe AerCap is still selling at a discount to its true book value and are encouraged for book value growth over the next several years.

Entegris (ENTG) is a leading semiconductor materials and services company. Entegris’ advanced materials and process solutions are used by all the major semiconductor manufacturers to reduce defects and maximize yields during the chip manufacturing process. In 2022, Entegris purchased CMC Materials for

17

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

$6 billion, a competitor with complementary products. After the acquisition was completed, Entegris integrated much of CMC’s products and announced over $1 billion of non-core asset sales. Most of these sales will be completed in the first half of 2024, the proceeds of which will help Entegris pay down the debt they issued to purchase CMC Materials. We believe the combined company is well positioned as semiconductor manufacturing recovers and accelerates over the next three-to-five years.

Danaher (DHR) is a leading provider of life science equipment and diagnostics solutions. Danaher’s management has a terrific history of smart acquisitions and strategic spin-off of slower growing segments. We’ve owned Danaher for nearly 10 years. Over that time, Danaher has transformed from a global industrial conglomerate to one that is focused on life sciences and healthcare, raising its organic growth rate from low-to-mid-single digits to mid-single-digit-plus. In 2023, Danaher took another step in that direction by spinning off its more cyclical water quality and product identification businesses into Veralto (VLTO). Danaher now has the capacity to make another value-enhancing acquisition. With capital markets thawing, we wouldn’t be surprised to hear from Danaher over the next one to two years.

We are happy to have produced strong 2023 results and are focused on continuing to find great companies to grow shareholder assets.

Quoc Tran
Chairman and Chief Investment Officer
Tran Capital Management
January 2024

Michael Im, CFA
Co-Portfolio Manager and Director of Research
Tran Capital Management
January 2024

18

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

It was an exciting and eventful year as Greenspring Fund reorganized into the Crom-well Greenspring Mid Cap Fund in August. Prior to the reorganization, Greenspring Fund was a fund with a long history of having a flexible allocation strategy that typically included a mix of predominately equity securities and some fixed income exposure. As part of the reorganization, the Fund transitioned to a mid-cap equity fund, a sector of the market that was always well represented in Greenspring Fund’s portfolio. Given the investment strategy shift during the year, comparing the Fund’s 2023 results to its current Russell Midcap Index benchmark is less relevant than it will be in future years. However, for 2023, the Cromwell Greenspring Mid Cap Fund generated a solid 11.95% total return, with the equity investments in the portfolio delivering a gain of approximately 13.40%. This result trailed the 17.23% total return of the Russell Midcap Index, but the Fund’s equity performance demonstrated significantly less volatility, as evidenced by its standard deviation of 15.2% vs. 20.1% for the Index. This reduced volatility was most evident during the August through Octo-ber market sell-off, as the Fund experienced considerably less downside movement, while still being in position to participate in the year-end rally.

The Fund’s holdings within the Industrials sector were the biggest positive contributors to performance during 2023. The Fund benefited not only from being significantly overweight the sector versus the Russell Midcap Index, but several of the Fund’s large holdings in the Industrial sector performed especially well. In particular, MYR Group and EMCOR Group posted significant gains during the year, driven by strong results and favorable outlooks for continued earnings growth. Both companies benefit from demand tailwinds associated with the transition to greater and more efficient use of electricity. The redevelopment of manufacturing capacity to provide critical supply chain resilience, government support for domestic manufacturing of electric vehicles and semiconductors, and further expansion of data centers to support the development of artificial intelligence are several drivers of the solid growth outlook for these companies. Republic Services was another holding that delivered a strong gain for the Fund. The nation’s second largest waste disposal company, Republic had another strong earnings year, driven by pricing gains and excellent acquisition integration execution, leading to higher-than-expected free cash flow generation. A long-time, large Fund holding, Republic also proved to be a strong ballast during the market correction from August to October. We expect the Company to continue to increase shareholder value through solid operational execution and accretive free cash flow deployment, particularly through acquisitions.

The Fund experienced negative performance in two sectors during the year—Health-care and Utilities. Fortunately, the Fund had underweight positions in these sectors, thus providing a positive contribution to relative performance versus the Russell

19

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

Midcap Index, given that these sectors also underperformed within the Index. The biggest area of the Fund’s relative underperformance was in the Information Technology sector, where the Fund was underweight compared to the Index, and its holdings underperformed as well. The Fund’s underweight position is a general reflection of finding what we believe is better value in other sectors, as our focus on companies with strong balance sheets and free cash flow generation trading at reasonable valuations often keeps us away from fast-growing companies trading at lofty price multiples given the high expectations and increased volatility commonly associated with these types of companies. While our underweight position in this sector significantly helped performance during 2022, shares of many of these types of companies bounced back in 2023, especially as interest rates decreased in the fourth quarter.

Looking forward, we are hopeful that the more dovish approach of the Federal Reserve now expected by the investment community will allow investors to change their focus from obsessive “Fed watching” to the valuations and fundamentals of individual companies. In today’s environment, we see the valuation of mid-cap stocks as particularly attractive, with a large disconnect in the price-to-earnings (P/E) multiples between mid- and large-cap stocks. As of December 2023, the estimated 2024 P/E of the Russell Midcap Index was approximately 15% lower than the S&P 500 Index’s—one of the largest disparities in over twenty years! We believe the Fund is very well positioned with the market likely to reward our emphasis on investing in well-capitalized businesses run by management teams with strong track records of creating shareholder value. Combined with our overriding focus on companies that generate high levels of free cash flow and are benefitting from secular and/or company specific tailwinds, we believe the portfolio is favorably situated for a variety of market environments.

We strive to produce solid long-term returns for the Fund’s shareholders, with lower volatility along the way. The last two years have been a great example of this strategy in action. Equity prices declined sharply during 2022, as investors wrestled with the difficulty of trying to predict economic growth, inflation, and the direction of monetary policy, but bounced back markedly in 2023. During this two-year period, the Fund’s equity investments outperformed the Russell Midcap Index (+3.47% vs. -3.07% on a cumulative basis) and delivered this performance with less volatility, as measured by its significantly lower standard deviation (17.4% vs. 21.8%). We firmly believe that less volatile performance, especially during periods of macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty, helps shareholders and advisors avoid the risk of making anxiety-driven investment decisions at the wrong time and stay focused on long-term investment goals.

20

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Management Commentary

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

We are excited to be a part of the Cromwell Funds family and are confident that the Fund can continue to help investors achieve their goals of steady, consistent long-term performance.

Charles vK. Carlson
President, Portfolio Manager and Co-CIO
Corbyn Investment Management
December 31, 2023

Michael Goodman
Portfolio Manager and Senior Investment Analyst
Corbyn Investment Management
December 31, 2023

21

CROMWELL FUNDS

Disclosures

December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

Must be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus.

Mutual fund investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible.

CenterSquare Real Estate Fund Risks: The Fund is subject to special risk considerations similar to those associated with the direct ownership of real estate. Real estate valuations may be subject to factors such as changing general and local economic, financial, competitive, and environmental conditions. A greater percentage of the Fund’s holdings may be focused in a smaller number of securities which may place the Fund at greater risk than a more diversified fund. Investing in initial public offerings (IPOs) is risky and the prices of stocks purchased in IPOs tend to fluctuate more widely than stocks of companies that have been publicly traded for a longer period of time. Stocks purchased in IPOs generally do not have a trading history, and information about the companies may be available for very limited periods. Market prices of investments held by the Fund may fall rapidly or unpredictably due to a variety of economic or political factors, market conditions, disasters or public health issues, or in response to events that affect particular industries or companies. Companies that are in similar industry sectors may be similarly affected by particular economic or market events; to the extent the Fund has substantial holdings within a particular sector, the risks associated with that sector increase.

Marketfield L/S Fund Risks: The Fund regularly makes short sales of securities, which involves the risk that losses may exceed the original amount invested. The Fund may also use options and futures contracts, which have the risks of unlimited losses of the underlying holdings due to unanticipated market movements and failure to correctly predict the direction of securities prices, interest rates, and currency exchange rates. However, a mutual fund investor’s risk is limited to the amount invested in a fund. Investments in absolute return strategies are not intended to outperform stocks and bonds during strong market rallies. Investing in ETFs are subject to additional risks that do not apply to conventional mutual funds, including the risks that the market price of the shares may trade at a discount to its net asset value (NAV), an active secondary trading market may not develop or be maintained, or trading may be halted by the exchange in which they trade, which may impact a Fund’s ability to sell its shares. Foreign securities are subject to interest rate, currency exchange rate, economic, and political risks. These risks may be greater for emerging markets. Investing in smaller companies involves special risks, including higher volatility and lower liquidity. Investing in mid-cap stocks may carry more risk than investing in stocks of larger, more well-established companies. This risk is usually greater for longer-term debt securities. Investment by the Fund in lower-rated and non-rated securities presents a greater risk of loss to principal and

22

CROMWELL FUNDS

Disclosures

December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

interest than higher-rated securities. Investments in asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities involve additional risks such as credit risk, prepayment risk, possible illiquidity and default, and increased susceptibility to adverse economic developments. The Fund involves the risk that the macroeconomic trends identified by portfolio management will not come to fruition and their advantageous duration may not last as long as portfolio management forecasts. The Fund may invest in derivatives, which may increase the volatility of the Fund’s NAV and may result in a loss to the Fund.

Foresight Global Sustainable Infrastructure Fund Risks: The Fund invests in foreign securities which involve greater volatility and political, economic and currency risks and differences in accounting methods. Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) and Sustainable investing may take into consideration factors beyond traditional financial information to select securities, which could result in relative investment performance deviating from other strategies or broad market benchmarks, depending on whether such sectors or investments are in or out of favor in the market. Further, ESG and Sustainable investing strategies may rely on certain values-based criteria to eliminate exposures found in similar strategies or broad market benchmarks, which could also result in relative investment performance deviating. There is no assurance that employing ESG and Sustainable strategies will result in more favorable investment performance. The Sub-Adviser utilizes its own company research, additional external research and the portfolio manager’s judgment to determine if a company is contributing positively to sustainable development. Infrastructure companies may be subject to a variety of factors that may adversely affect their business, including high interest costs, high leverage, regulation costs, economic slowdown, surplus capacity, increased competition, lack of fuel availability and energy conversation policies. The Fund is non-diversified and therefore a greater percentage of holdings may be focused in a small number of issuers or a single issuer, which can place the Fund at greater risk. The Fund is new with no operating history. Investing in Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) involves certain risks related to investing in the underlying assets of the MLPs and risks associated with pooled investment vehicles. Investing in ETFs are subject to additional risks that do not apply to conventional mutual funds, including the risks that the market price of the shares may trade at a discount to its net asset value (NAV), an active secondary trading market may not develop or be maintained, or trading may be halted by the exchange in which they trade, which may impact a Fund’s ability to sell its shares.

Tran Sustainable Focus Fund Risks: The Fund normally invests its assets in the common stocks of approximately 15 to 25 mid- and large-cap companies with a sustainable competitive advantage. In addition, the Fund may from time to time

23

CROMWELL FUNDS

Disclosures

December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

purchase a common stock that does not meet this criteria if, in the investment advisor’s opinion, the stock represents a particularly attractive investment opportunity. While most assets will be invested in U.S. common stocks, other securities may also be purchased in keeping with the Fund’s investment objectives. The Fund is non-diversified, which means that a significant portion of the Fund’s assets may be invested in the securities of a single or small number of companies and/or in a more limited number of sectors than a diversified mutual fund. The Fund is subject to greater risk and could fluctuate in value more than other mutual funds diversified across a greater number of securities and industries. The Sub-Adviser’s use of its ESG framework could cause it to perform differently compared to funds that do not have such a policy. The criteria related to this ESG framework may result in the Fund forgoing opportunities to buy certain securities when it might otherwise be advantageous to do so, or selling securities for ESG reasons when it might be otherwise disadvantageous for it to do so.

Greenspring Mid Cap Fund Risks: Mid-capitalization companies may be subject to greater price volatility, significantly lower trading volumes, and cyclical, static or moderate growth prospects than equity securities of larger companies. The investment strategies, practices and risk analysis used may not produce the desired results.

Active share measures the percentage of stock holdings in a fund that differ from a benchmark. Alpha is the excess return of an investment relative to the return of a benchmark index. A basis point is one hundredth of one percent. Book value is the value of a security or asset as entered in a company’s books. Free cash flow is the cash a company generates after taking into consideration cash outflows that support its operations and maintain its capital assets. Price to earnings (P/E) measures a company’s current share price relative to its per-share earnings. The yield curve plots the interest rates, at a set point in time, of bonds having equal credit quality, but differing maturity dates. Standard deviation is a statistical measure of historical volatility.

The FTSE Nareit All Equity REITs Index is an index of U.S. equity REITs. Constituents include all tax-qualified REITs with more than 50% of total assets in qualifying real estate assets other than mortgages secured by real property. The Russell 2000 Index measures the performance of the 2,000 smaller companies included in the Russell 3000 Index. The Russell Midcap Index is comprised of approximately 800 publicly traded U.S. companies with market caps of between approximately $1.5 and $51 billion as of the last annual index reconstruction. The S&P Global Infrastructure Index is designed to track 75 companies from around the world that represent the listed infrastructure industry while maintaining liquidity and tradability. The S&P 500 Index is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks.

24

CROMWELL FUNDS

Disclosures

December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

The S&P 500 Equal Weight Index is the equal-weight version of the S&P 500 with each company allocated a fixed weight of 0.2% at each quarterly rebalance. The S&P 600 Index measures the small-cap segment of the U.S. equity market. Indices are unmanaged, are not available for investment and do not incur expenses.

Earnings growth is not representative of the Fund’s future performance.

Fund holdings and sector allocations are subject to change and should not be considered a recommendation to buy or sell any security. For a complete list of fund holdings, please refer to the Schedule of Investments section of this report.

Cromwell Funds distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC.

25

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Fund Performance

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

Comparison of $10,000 Investment

The chart assumes an initial investment of $10,000. Performance reflects waivers of fee and operating expenses in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced. Past performance is not predictive of future performance. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that your shares, when redeemed may be worth more or less than their original cost. Performance current to the most recent month-end may be lower or higher than the performance quoted and can be obtained by calling 1-855-625-7333. Performance assumes the reinvestment of capital gains and income distributions. The performance does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

26

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Fund Performance

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

The following is expense information for the Cromwell CenterSquare Real Estate Fund as disclosed in the most recent prospectus dated April 30, 2023: Investor Class – Gross Expenses: 1.11%, Net Expenses: 1.12%; Institutional Class – Gross Expenses: 1.01%, Net Expenses: 1.02%. The Fund’s Investment Adviser has contractually agreed to limit fund operating expenses through 4/30/24. Please refer to the prospectus for detailed information.

27

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Fund Performance

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

Comparison of $25,000 Investment⁽¹⁾

The chart assumes an initial investment of $25,000. Performance reflects waivers of fee and operating expenses in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced. Past performance is not predictive of future performance. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that your shares, when redeemed may be worth more or less than their original cost. Performance current to the most recent month-end may be lower or higher than the performance quoted and can be obtained by calling 1-855-625-7333. Performance assumes the reinvestment of capital gains and income distributions. The performance does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

28

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Fund Performance

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

The following is expense information for the Cromwell Marketfield L/S Fund as disclosed in the most recent prospectus dated April 30, 2023: Investor Class – Gross Expenses: 2.50%, Net Expenses: 2.31%; Institutional Class – Gross Expenses: 2.25%, Net Expenses: 2.06%. The Fund’s Investment Adviser has contractually agreed to limit fund operating expenses through 4/30/24. Please refer to the prospectus for detailed information.

29

CROMWELL FORESIGHT GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Fund Performance

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

Comparison of $10,000 Investment

The chart assumes an initial investment of $10,000. Performance reflects waivers of fee and operating expenses in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced. Past performance is not predictive of future performance. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that your shares, when redeemed may be worth more or less than their original cost. Performance current to the most recent month-end may be lower or higher than the performance quoted and can be obtained by calling 1-855-625-7333. Performance assumes the reinvestment of capital gains and income distributions. The performance does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

Rates of Return as of December 31, 2023

The following is expense information for the Cromwell Foresight Global Sustainable Infrastructure Fund as disclosed in the most recent prospectus dated January 31, 2023: Institutional Class – Gross Expenses: 1.73%, Net Expenses: 1.33%. The Fund’s Investment Adviser has contractually agreed to limit fund operating expenses through 1/31/25. Please refer to the prospectus for detailed information.

30

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Fund Performance

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

Comparison of $10,000 Investment

The chart assumes an initial investment of $10,000. Performance reflects waivers of fee and operating expenses in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced. Past performance is not predictive of future performance. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that your shares, when redeemed may be worth more or less than their original cost. Performance current to the most recent month-end may be lower or higher than the performance quoted and can be obtained by calling 1-855-625-7333. Performance assumes the reinvestment of capital gains and income distributions. The performance does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

Annualized Rates of Return as of December 31, 2023

The following is expense information for the Cromwell Tran Sustainable Focus Fund as disclosed in the most recent prospectus dated August 31, 2023: Investor Class – Gross Expenses: 1.96%, Net Expenses: 1.10%; Institutional Class – Gross Expenses: 1.71%, Net Expenses: 0.85%. The Fund’s Investment Adviser has contractually agreed to limit fund operating expenses through 8/31/24. Please refer to the prospectus for detailed information.

31

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Fund Performance

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

Comparison of $10,000 Investment

The chart assumes an initial investment of $10,000. Performance reflects waivers of fee and operating expenses in effect. In the absence of such waivers, total return would be reduced. Past performance is not predictive of future performance. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that your shares, when redeemed may be worth more or less than their original cost. Performance current to the most recent month-end may be lower or higher than the performance quoted and can be obtained by calling 1-855-625-7333. Performance assumes the reinvestment of capital gains and income distributions. The performance does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or the redemption of Fund shares.

Annualized Rates of Return as of December 31, 2023

The following is expense information for the Cromwell Greenspring Mid Cap Fund as disclosed in the most recent prospectus dated August 14, 2023: Institutional Class – Gross and Net Expenses: 1.11%. The Fund’s Investment Adviser has contractually agreed to limit fund operating expenses through 8/14/25. Please refer to the prospectus for detailed information.

32

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND
Holdings Presentations⁽¹⁾
As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

33

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Holdings Presentations⁽¹⁾

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

34

CROMWELL FORESIGHT GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Holdings Presentations⁽¹⁾

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

35

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Holdings Presentations⁽¹⁾

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

36

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Holdings Presentations⁽¹⁾

As of December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

37

CROMWELL FUNDS
Expense Examples
December 31, 2023 (Unaudited)

As a shareholder of a Fund, you incur two types of costs: (1) transactions costs, including brokerage commissions on purchases and sales of Fund shares, and (2) ongoing costs, including management fees; distribution and/or service (12b-1) fees, shareholder servicing fees, and other Fund expenses. This Example is intended to help you understand your ongoing costs (in dollars) of investing in the Fund and to compare these costs with the ongoing costs of investing in other mutual funds. The Example is based on an investment of $1,000 invested at the beginning of the period and held for the entire period.

ACTUAL EXPENSES

For each class, the first line of the table provides information about actual account values and actual expenses. You may use the information in this line, together with the amount you invested, to estimate the expenses that you paid over the period. Simply divide your account value by $1,000 (for example, an $8,600 account value divided by $1,000 = 8.6), then multiply the result by the number in the first line under the heading entitled “Expenses Paid During Period” to estimate the expenses you paid on your account during this period.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES

For each class, the second line of the table below provides information about hypothetical account values and hypothetical expenses based on the Fund’s actual expense ratio and an assumed rate of return of 5% per year before expenses, which is not the Fund’s actual return. The hypothetical account values and expenses may not be used to estimate the actual ending account balance or expenses you paid for the period. You may use this information to compare the ongoing costs of investing in the Fund and other funds. To do so, compare this 5% hypothetical example with the 5% hypothetical examples that appear in the shareholder reports of the other funds.

Please note that the expenses shown in the tables are meant to highlight your ongoing costs only. Therefore, the second line of the tables are useful in comparing ongoing costs only, and will not help you determine the relative total costs of owning different funds, In addition, if transactional costs were included, your costs may have been higher.

38

CROMWELL FUNDS

Expense Examples

December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

Cromwell CenterSquare Real Estate Fund

Cromwell Marketfield L/S Fund

Cromwell Foresight Global Sustainable Infrastructure Fund

39

CROMWELL FUNDS

Expense Examples

December 31, 2023 (Unaudited) — (Continued)

Cromwell Tran Sustainable Focus Fund

Cromwell Greenspring Mid Cap Fund

40

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023

See Notes to Financial Statements

41

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

See Notes to Financial Statements

42

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

See Notes to Financial Statements

43

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023

See Notes to Financial Statements

44

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

See Notes to Financial Statements

45

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

Abbreviations:

ADR American Depositary Receipt

The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS®) was developed by and/or is the exclusive property of MSCI, Inc. and Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (“S&P”). GICS is a service mark of MSCI and S&P and has been licensed for use by U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC.

See Notes to Financial Statements

46

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

(a) Non-income producing security.

See Notes to Financial Statements

47

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

Abbreviations:

Ltd. Limited is a term indicating a company is incorporated and shareholders have limited liability.

The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS®) was developed by and/or is the exclusive property of MSCI, Inc. and Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (“S&P”). GICS is a service mark of MSCI and S&P and has been licensed for use by U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC.

See Notes to Financial Statements

48

CROMWELL FORESIGHT GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023

See Notes to Financial Statements

49

CROMWELL FORESIGHT GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

(a) Foreign issued security.

(b) Non-income producing security.

Abbreviations:

AG  Aktiengesellschaft is a German term that refers to a corporation that is limited by shares, i.e. owned by shareholders.

ASA Advanced Subscription Agreement is an equity instrument where investors ‘pre-pay’ for shares in a company.

See Notes to Financial Statements

50

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023

See Notes to Financial Statements

51

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

(a) Non-income producing security.

See Notes to Financial Statements

52

CROMWELL TRAN SUSTAINABLE FOCUS FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

Abbreviations:

The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS®) was developed by and/or is the exclusive property of MSCI, Inc. and Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (“S&P”). GICS is a service mark of MSCI and S&P and has been licensed for use by U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC.

See Notes to Financial Statements

53

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023

See Notes to Financial Statements

54

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

See Notes to Financial Statements

55

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

See Notes to Financial Statements

56

CROMWELL GREENSPRING MID CAP FUND

Schedule of Investments

December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

Abbreviations:

The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS®) was developed by and/or is the exclusive property of MSCI, Inc. and Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (“S&P”). GICS is a service mark of MSCI and S&P and has been licensed for use by U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC.

See Notes to Financial Statements

57

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Assets & Liabilities

As of December 31, 2023

⁽¹⁾ Serves as collateral for securities sold short.

See Notes to Financial Statements

58

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Assets & Liabilities

As of December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

⁽¹⁾ Unlimited number of shares authorized with no par value.

See Notes to Financial Statements

59

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Assets & Liabilities

As of December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

See Notes to Financial Statements

60

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Assets & Liabilities

As of December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

⁽¹⁾ Unlimited number of shares authorized with no par value.

See Notes to Financial Statements

61

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Operations

For the year ended December 31, 2023

See Notes to Financial Statements

62

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Operations

For the year ended December 31, 2023 — (Continued)

⁽¹⁾ Since commencement of operations on January 31, 2023.

See Notes to Financial Statements

63

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Operations (Continued)

⁽¹⁾ For the period May 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023. On November 1, 2023 the Tran Sustainable Focus Fund changed its fiscal year end from April 30 to December 31.

See Notes to Financial Statements

64

CROMWELL FUNDS

Statements of Operations (Continued)

⁽¹⁾ For the period May 1, 2023 through December 31, 2023. On November 1, 2023 the Tran Sustainable Focus Fund changed its fiscal year end from April 30 to December 31.

See Notes to Financial Statements

65

CROMWELL CENTERSQUARE REAL ESTATE FUND

Statements of Changes in Net Assets

See Notes to Financial Statements

66

CROMWELL MARKETFIELD L/S FUND

Statements of Changes in Net Assets